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Security Information

Possibility of important Soviet move in Germany.

Reasons:

- 1) East Berlin riot represents severe reverse. Need some action to counter its effect.
- 2) East German Communist government has failed and must

 be totally reorganized. German elections come first week

 September. Soviet action against Adenauer and EDC if

 effective in electoral campaign must come quickly.
- view recall of some 20 high ranking Soviet officials from

 East Germany, including it is believed the High Commissioner,

 Semenov. (Also Soviet Ambassadors US, UK, France, etc.

 have returned), Malik o on few much motice,

 Sov Ceub. Fran left with 9 Much Micals)

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- 4) Major withdrawal of Soviet aircraft from East Germany.
- 5) Beria mysteriously missing from June 27 Bolshoi theater ceremony when all other important Soviet officials present. Was he in Germany or visiting atomic energy installations, etc?
- 6) Dutch officials usually well informed expect some important Soviet action regarding Germany.

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If the Soviet is in fact preparing for some drastic move in

Germany it would explain their apparent desire for truce in Korea.

A peace offensive more in Germany would be dulled by continuance of Korean hostilities.

The probabilities that Soviet wants Korean truce indicated by:

- 1) The failure to attempt vigorous exploitation our difficulties with Syngman Rhee.
- 2) Communist official reaction regarding prisoner release relatively mild and propaganda was left for radio exploitation.
- 3) Communists have kept up attack particularly on ROK forces possibly to remind them of difficulties of going it alone.

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4) Soviet Ambassador Peking informed Swedish Ambassador (apparently for repetition to us) that Chinese demand that escaped prisoners should be recaptured was not to be taken literally and that Rhee coup had no military significance. Also that unnecessary transfer of PWs outside of Korea and congratulated Swedish government to sending forward their prisoner screening mission. Also Vishinsky told Swedish Ambassador Moscow that it was most important, (since Rhee had tried sabotage agreement) that every effort be concentrated on reaching Armistice. Tel also to In 37964 - VI - CC NONA story stary order to Ja Kung Bo HK - CC - NK will NOT

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